JUDICIALLY CONFERRED DEFENSE
IMMUNITY IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT: HELP
OR HINDRANCE TO CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS?
Lawrence S. Lustberg*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith,' a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit' reached a
conclusion never before reached, and never since agreed with or
applied by a federal court. Ignoring its own precedent' as well as
the unanimous decisions of other courts of appeals, 4 the Third
Circuit held that district courts have "inherent authority to effectuate [a] defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a
judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is
essential to an effective defense." 5 This holding has been subject
to a storm of scholarly6 and judicial7 criticism. More significantly, almost a decade later, Smith continues to stand alone,
scorned by every other court of appeals,' severely limited by subsequent decisions of the Third Circuit, 9 and so strictly applied by
the district courts of this Circuit that the remedy it created has
* Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., Harvard University, 1979; M.A. (equiv.), University of Stockholm, 1980; J.D., Harvard University, 1983. The author is presently an Assistant Federal Public Defender for the
District of New Jersey.
I 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
2 Judges Gibbons, Weis and Garth sat on the Smith Panel, Judge Garth writing
the opinion of the court.
3 See United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 972 (1979); United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228-229 (3d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973).
4 Prior to Smith, other courts of appeals considering whether a defendant could
successfully demand a grant of immunity for a potential defense witness held that
they lacked the power to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512,
517-20 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); Earl v. United States, 361
F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
5 615 F.2d at 969 (quoting United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)).
6 See, e.g., Flanagan, Compelled Immunitv For Defense Witnesses: Hidden Costs and
Questions, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 447 (1981).
7 See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
9 See text accompanying infra notes 115-48.
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yet to be invoked in print.'
This article seeks to explain the remarkable lack of generative power of Smith, which has resulted not only in an uninvoked
remedy, but also in an unvindicated right. Indeed, while Smith
purported to be solicitous and protective of defendant's rights,
its effect has been to curtail those rights. Stated simply, criminal
defendants would have been better off without Smith.
In seeking to explain this anomalous result, this article first
outlines the problem that Smith sought to solve, second traces the
genesis of that decision and third explores other courts' response
to it. Ultimately it seeks to explain why Smith has been so devoid
of precedential weight and to explore the comparative effect of
this weakness. Underlying this analysis is the concern that in this
area as in others, the Third Circuit has protected criminal defendants' rights less than it purports to, as well as less than it
should. '
II.

THE PROBLEM:

COMPULSORY PROCESS VS.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Consider the plight of the criminal defendant, charged with
a serious federal offense, whose only exculpatory witness will not
testify for fear of incriminating herself. At first blush, the case
presents a difficult if common conflict between the defendant's
sixth amendment 2 right "to have compulsory process for ob3
taining witnesses in his favor" and the witness' fifth amendment'
1O See text accompanying infra notes 149-74.
II See also Marino, Outrageous Conduct: The Third Circuit's Treatment of the Due Process
Defense, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 606 (1989).
12 The sixth amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
13 The fifth amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
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right not to incriminate herself. 14
This conflict, however, would easily be resolved by a grant of
immunity like that provided for in the federal immunity statute."
The defendant would obtain the benefit of the witness' testimony, for once granted immunity, the witness would be required
to testify or face imprisonment until the conclusion of the court
proceeding.' 6 The witness, on the other hand, would be fully
protected since neither her testimony nor its fruits could be used
against her in any criminal case. 17 The scope of her immunity is
precisely co-extensive with her fifth amendment privilege and
would thus suffice to supplant it.' 8
Attractive as this solution may be, until Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith," 9 it was not available to defendants or courts
seeking to accommodate these competing constitutional concerns. That is because immunity is purely a creature of statute
and the statute governing grants of immunity for purposes of
grand jury or trial testimony empowers only a United States Attorney "with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General"
to seek an order granting a witness immunity."0 While such an
order should be granted only when the testimony sought "may
be necessary to the public interest"'" and when the witness "has
refused or is likely to refuse to testify . . . on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, ' 22 these are matters left to
cess of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
14 This is not the only

scenario in which fifth and sixth amendment rights clash.

Where, for example, a defendant requires the testimony of a co-defendant who
wishes to exercise his fifth amendment right not to testify, the Third Circuit has
consistently held that a severance may be necessary. See United States v. Dickens,
695 F.2d 765, 779 n.19 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983); United
States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 198-99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071
(1982); United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
911 (1978); United States v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149, 155-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied., 434

U.S. 862 (1977).
15 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1982).
16

28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)(1) (1982).

18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
18 See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123 & n.10 (1980).
17

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
19 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
20 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1982).
21 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) (1982).
22

18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(2) (1982).

See also
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the "judgment" of the United States Attorney.23
Thus, it is up to the executive branch to determine whether
"gaining the witness' testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for criminal prosecution of that witness." 24 The role of the
judicial branch in overseeing this process is accordingly limited
and is best described as "ministerial. '2 5 The district court's function is merely to determine whether the executive has complied
with the requirements of the statute,26 and "to find the facts on
which the order is predicated. ' 27 Indeed, district courts lack the
power to deny properly presented applications for statutory
*
21
immunity.
The question presented in Smith was whether courts could
grant immunity absent an executive request. Prior to Smith,
courts had unanimously held that such independent judicial
grants of defense witness immunity would violate the separation
of powers doctrine. 29 Hence, although "[flew rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his
own defense,"3 " such sixth amendment compulsory process right
was left unvindicated by the limitations of the federal statute. In
Smith, the Third Circuit attempted to rectify this problem in dramatic fashion.
18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1982).
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Pearce, 792 F.2d 397, 402 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1016 (3d Cir. 1973)); United States v.
Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th
Cir. 1973).
26 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 434 (1956).
27 Pillsbury Co., 459 U.S. at 254 n.l I (citations omitted).
28 See, e.g., Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 432-33 ("A fair reading of [the predecessor to 18
U.S.C. § 6003(b)] does not indicate that the district judge has any discretion to
deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant it."); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 657 F.2d 88, 90-91 (6th Cir. 1981); Ryan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
820 (1978).
29 See supra notes 3 and 4.
30 Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646, 652 (1988) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). Compulsory process rights are to be balanced against
and do not "invariably outweigh countervailing public interests." Id. at 655. Thus,
just last term, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's sixth amendment right to
compulsory process was not violated where a defense witness was barred from testifying because his identity had not been previously disclosed, as required. Id. at
657. In performing the mandated balancing, "[t]he integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection
of unreliable evidence; the interest in the fair and efficient administration ofjustice;
and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process
must be [weighed]." Id. at 655.
23
24
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III.

THE EVOLUTION OF SMITH IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT:

647
THE

ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT FROM WHICH SMITH
DEPARTED

The Third Circuit's decision in Smith was particularly extreme given the background from which it emerged. For
notwithstanding the court's protestations to the contrary, Smith
involved an obvious rejection of prior case law. Although the vitality of that precedent had been questioned a little over a year
before,3' Smith nonetheless ventured where the court never
before had been, and where no other court, even those bound by
its precedent, has followed.
The Third Circuit first addressed a defendant's request for
defense witness immunity in United States v. Berrigan. In Berrgan, the district court denied an immunity request made during
trial for unspecified witnesses, ruling that it had "no authority
to grant such immunity or to demand that the government seek
immunity for defense witnesses. 31 4 On appeal, the Third Circuit 35 addressed that point summarily, writing only, "[w]e agree
[with the district court]," and citing cases from three other circuits holding that such authority did not exist 13 Initially, then,
the court rejected both the argument that courts can grant immunity to potential defense witnesses and the contention that courts
can order the government to do so.
The first of these two propositions survived three subsequent decisions of the court. In United States v. Morrison,3 7 the
Third Circuit unambiguously ruled that "courts have invariably
held that they lack power to grant immunity except on request of
the Government. '"38 In United States v. Niederberger,3 9 the court
31 See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441

U.S. 913 (1979).
32 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973).
33 Id. at 190. The Smith Court distinguished Benigan on this ground, though it

was not the basis for the Berrigan Court's decision. Smith, 615 F.2d at 972 n.11.
34 Berrgan, 482 F.2d at 190.
35 Judges Van Dusen, Aldisert and Rosenn sat on the panel. Id. at 173. Judge
Aldisert authored the opinion of the court.

36 Id. at 190 (citing United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971); United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); Morrison v. United States, 365 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967)).
37 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
38 Id. at 229 (citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 195 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 999 (1975)).
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wrote: "The rule in this Circuit is clear; a trial court has no authority to provide use immunity for a defense witness." ' 40 And, in
United States v. Rocco, 4 the court quoted the above passage, concluding also that "it has been uniformly accepted that the grant
or denial of immunity is within the sole discretion of the executive branch of government and thus, neither the courts nor defense counsel may force the prosecutor to compel the testimony
of a defense witness." 4 2 Thus, as of November 14, 1978," the
Third Circuit was in step with the nation's other courts of appeals: 44 judges had no authority to grant immunity to potential
defense witnesses.
Nor did the Court blaze or purport to blaze a new path in
United States v. Morrison."5 In Morrison, the Assistant United States
Attorney prosecuting the case subjected a potential defense witness to a "barrage of warnings" regarding the possible conse39 580 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978). Judges Rosenn,
Higginbotham and Barlow presided, with Judge Barlow, a district judge sitting by
designation, writing the opinion of the court.
40 Id. at 67 (citing United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228-29 (3d Cir.
1976); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973)). In a footnote,
the court reasoned that "[t]he function of the trial court is limited to determining
whether a request for immunity made by the government is in accord with the statutory procedure." Id. at 67 n.7 (citing Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 43334 (1956)).
41 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979). Judge Adams
wrote the opinion of the court and was joined by Chief Judge Seitz and Judge
Rosenn.
42 Id. at 147 and n.10. In Rocco, the district court had ruled that "if a court did
find that the testimony of a witness invoking privilege would exculpate a defendant,
and the government withheld the immunity which would make the testimony available to the defendant even while insisting on continuing to prosecute him, a Sixth
Amendment breach would occur." United States v. La Duca, 447 F. Supp. 779, 787
(D.N.J.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979). In such circumstances, if the defendant could not receive a fair trial, a district court could dismiss an indictment. LaDuca, 447 F. Supp.
at 787. In so holding, the district court relied entirely upon law review articles,
recognizing that the case law was to the contrary. See id. at 787 n.8 (citing Westen,
The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MicH. L. REV. 71, 166-70 (1974); Comment, Right of
the Criminal Defendant to the Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 953,
956 n. 19 (1967); Comment, A Re-Examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Use

for Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 74, 79 (1972); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory

Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REV. 567 (1978)).
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's reasoning, but affirmed on
other grounds. Rocco, 587 F.2d at 148.
43 Rocco was decided on November 14, 1978. Its holding, however, survived less
than a week, for on November 17, 1978, the court decided United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). See text accompanying infra notes 54-81.
44 See supra notes 4, 36, 38. See also infra note 180.
5 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
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quences of her testimony,4 6 culminating in a "highly intimidating
personal interview." '47 As a result, she refused to answer a
number of questions while on the stand, "thus depriving [the defendant] of much of the evidence he had expected to place before
the jury."'4 8 Finding the prosecutor's actions to be "completely
unnecessary" and "bizarre," the Third Circuit ordered a new
trial for the defendant. 49 Concerned that such trial be a fair one,
but lacking the power to itself grant immunity to the witness,
Judge Forman declared:
There are circumstances under which it appears due process
may demand that the Government request use immunity for a
defendant's witness. Such a circumstance was created in this
case when prosecutorial misconduct caused the defendant's
principal witness to withhold out of fear of self-incrimination
testimony which would otherwise allegedly have been available to the-defendant.
At the new trial, in the event that the defendant calls Sally
Bell as a witness, if she invokes her Fifth Amendment right not
to testify, a judgment of acquittal shall be entered unless the
Government, pursuant 5to° [federal statute], requests use immunity for her testimony.
Thus, Morrison stands for the proposition that under circumstances evidencing prosecutorial misconduct, the government may
be required to choose between immunizing a defense witness or dismissing an indictment. It authorizes a district court neither to grant
immunity to a defense witness nor to order the government to do
so. Accordingly, it has been limited to never-again-seen instances of
prosecutorial misconduct, 5 ' or at least, to "extraordinary
circumstances." 5 2
Thus, as of the Rocco decision, the Third Circuit had precluded
district courts from either granting immunity to prospective defense
46 Id. at 225-26.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 226.

Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 229 (citations omitted). Judge Rosenn dissented on the ground that the
witness was not in fact, intimidated, and the defendant therefore received a fair
trial. Id. at 229-31 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
51 See United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 840 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(en banc); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979).
52 United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 980 (1978). This vague term has been neither the subject of further judicial
explication, nor the basis of relief to any defendant.
4'9
50
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witnesses or from ordering the government to do so. Indeed, even
where prosecutorial misconduct was involved, it had left the choice
of whether to grant such immunity to the government, which also
was required to bear the consequences of its choice. Three days
later, however, the court began a course of evolution that was
neither presaged by nor grounded upon established Third Circuit
precedent.
IV.

THE BREAKDOWN OF ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT: HERMAN

AND ITS PROGENY

The erosion of established precedent regarding defense witness immunity began on November 17, 1978, only three days after the Third Circuit reaffirmed such precedent in United States v.
Rocco. 5 On that date, the court decided United States v. Herman5 4
in an opinion containing its most comprehensive discussion of
defense witness immunity. Although it approved the trial court's
refusal to grant immunity to certain potential defense witnesses,
the Herman court for the first time questioned whether courts
might have "inherent authority to effectuate the defendant's
compulsory process right by conferring a judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is essential to an effective
defense." 5 5 Finding, however, that the question had not been
raised in either the district court or Court of Appeals, the Third
56
Circuit reserved decision on the issue.
In Herman, two Pennsylvania state court magistrates appealed from their convictions for violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by accepting bribes
or kickbacks from a bail bonding firm in return for referring bail
bond business to the firm and, for example, accepting invalid
bonds as bail. 57 In his defense, Magistrate Herman sought to introduce the testimony of four constables who purportedly would
have testified that they split certain monies collected from the
bail bonding firm among themselves, never passing them along
53 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979).
54 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). Judges Gibbons, Hunter and Garth sat on the Herman panel, with Judge Gibbons writing the
majority opinion. Judge Garth concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing
that the federal immunity statute should be construed to allowjudicial review of the
decision of a United States Attorney not to seek immunity for defense witnesses.
Id. at 1205-14.
55 Id. at 1204.
56 Id. at 1204-05.
57 Id. at 1194-95.

1989]

DEFENSE IMMUNITY

to Herman. The constables asserted their privilege against selfincrimination and the district court denied defendant Herman's
application "that the government and the court grant them immunity . . . or in the alternative that the indictment . . . be
dismissed."'5 8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first
held that in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct, the holding
of United States v. Morrison59 did not apply. The court thus rejected the argument that under Morrison, "defendants have a general sixth amendment right to demand that witnesses of their
choice be immunized or that their indictments be dismissed." 6
Rather, the court adhered to the precedent in its own and other
circuits refusing to find such a right.6 ' Accordingly, it denied the
defendant's sixth amendment claim.
The Court also rejected defendants' argument that there is a
statutory basis for reviewing a federal prosecutor's decision not
to grant immunity to a prospective witness. Holding that such
argument "raises grave issues of separation of powers, ' 6 2 the
court reaffirmed the judiciary's limited role in reviewing immunity applications. It concluded that the separation of powers
concerns that bar judicial review of a prosecutor's application for
a grant of immunity "apply with equal force to a court order requiring such a grant. ' 63 Moreover, the court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 64 did not provide for review of
a prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity to a prospective defense
witness. Insofar as the immunity statutes and their legislative history evidenced no intent to benefit criminal defendants, explained the court, such defendants lacked standing to proceed
under the APA.6 5
Finally, the court also rejected a due process challenge to the
prosecution's failure to grant defense witnesses immunity in a
case in which several of its own witnesses had testified under
grants of immunity. In light of "our governmental system's
strong tradition of deference to prosecutorial discretion, and of
the necessary tendency of the executive branch to exercise that
58

Id. at 1199.

59 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
60 Herman, 589
61 Id. at 1200.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See 5 U.S.C.
65 Herman, 589

F.2d at 1199-1200.

§§ 700-706 (1982).
F.2d at 1202-03.
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discretion in ways that make it more likely that defendants will be
convicted, "66 the court held that a defendant could not prevail on
a claim that a prosecutor had improperly denied immunity to
prospective defense witnesses unless he showed "that the government's decisions were made with the deliberate intention of
distorting the judicial fact finding process.

' 6'

The court con-

cluded that absent a showing of unconstitutional abuse, district
courts lack the power to order remedial grants of statutory immunity to a defense witness.
The Third Circuit thus rejected each of defendant Herman's
arguments. In dictum, however, it speculated that "a case might
be made that the court has inherent authority to effectuate the
defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a judicially
fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is essential
to an effective defense." 68 Finding precedent for such authority
in the judicially created immunity available to defendants litigating certain pretrial issues, 6 9 as well as in defendants' due process
70
right to have clearly exculpatory evidence presented to the jury,
the court questioned why these principles "would not provide
the basis for a grant of immunity in the proper circumstances. '"7'
Conceding that the existence and application of such a grant
might "raise a host of difficult issues," 7 2 and that prior Third Circuit case law "may well be regarded as at least sub silentio rejections of this rationale, ' 73 the court left the issue for a day when it
was properly presented to the Court, perhaps sitting en banc.7 4
Judge Garth dissented on two grounds. First, he disagreed
with the majority's formulation of the constitutional standard to
be applied in reviewing the government's failure to grant immu66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.

at 1203-04 (citations omitted).
at 1204.

69 Id. In particular, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (immunizing a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing), its own decisions in United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d
Cir. 1977)(immunizing defendant's testimony in support of a double jeopardy
claim), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979), and In re GrandJury Investigation, 587 F.2d
589 (3d Cir. 1978) (immunizing defendant's testimony in support of speech or debate Clause claim). Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204.
70 Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204 & n.13 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973)).
71 Id. at 1204.
72 Id. For example, the court feared that grants of immunity such as those it was
suggesting "would on some occasions unduly interfere with important interests of
the prosecution." Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1204-05.
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nity to a defense witness. Specifically, he rejected the majority's
requirement of a demonstration of prosecutorial bad faith in
favor of a standard whereby due process is deemed to be violated
by an unfair distortion of the fact finding process, whether or not
intended by the government.7 5 In addition, he argued that the
government's decision not to grant immunity to a defense witness is reviewable for abuse of discretion under the APA.7 6 If an
abuse of discretion is found, according to Judge Garth, the government should have the choice of either seeking immunity for
the defense witness at issue or having a judgment of acquittal
entered.7 In no event, Judge Garth concluded, should federal
courts have the power to grant immunity to trial witnesses. 78
The effect of Herman was to cloud an otherwise clear picture.
Though the Herman court professed to adhere to the pre-existing
doctrine that courts were not empowered by statute or the Constitution to grant defense witness immunity, it concluded that
"inherent authority" might exist to do so. Nevertheless,
presented with a case in which the defense sought immunity for
witnesses who would offer important exculpatory evidence, the
Court refused to reach the issue. It thus left the question of defense witness immunity for the future, its contours and rationale
uncertain and even the procedure by which it would be formulated--"perhaps by the court sitting in banc" 79 -up in the air.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, while purporting to expand defendant's rights, the Herman court's narrow construction
of Morrison in fact decreased the circumstances under which defendants deprived of witnesses by the government's actions
could obtain relief. For although Morrison had explicitly disclaimed reliance on the prosecutor's bad faith,8" the Herman court
required a showing "that the government's decisions were made
75 Id. at 1206-07 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76 Id. at 1208-13 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77 Id. at 1213 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78 Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976); United States
v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977)).
Id. at 1205.
80 See Morrison, 535 F.2d at 227. The Morrison court stated:
79

The good faith of the Assistant United States Attorney would be relevant if he were charged with [a] violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 which
makes the intimidation of a federal witness a criminal offense. It is not,
however, relevant to an inquiry into whether a defendant was denied his
constitutional right.
Id. (Emphasis in original). Judge Garth quoted this passage in his dissent in Herman. See Herman, 589 F.2d at 1207 n.3 (Garth,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
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with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding
process."'
Hence, for the short term, Herman proved both conservative and confusing.
Indeed, the one relevant case decided by the Third Circuit
between Herman and Smith demonstrated both of these shortcomings. In United States v. Bacheler,8 2 the court affirmed the trial
court's denial of immunity for an undisclosed "prospective defense witness. ' 8 3 This result was based on a jumble of overlapping and poorly delineated rationales: that courts have no
statutory authority to immunize defense witnesses;8 4 that
prosecutorial threats or vindictiveness were not present in the
case;8 5 and that defendants had failed to establish
that this was a case in which it would be appropriate to consider the application of a judicially fashioned immunity within
the parameters advanced by this court in United States v. Herman for circumstances in which the "government's decisions
[regarding immunity grants] were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process" or when
"clearly exculpatory testimony" will be excluded because of a
86
witness' assertion of the fifth amendment privilege.
The court concluded that the Herman decision did not provide for
relief based upon the simple unfairness inherent in the prosecu87
tion's use of immunized testimony not available to the defense.
The Bacheler court thus revealed the uncertainty into which Herman had cast the debate: it recognized its lack of statutory authority
to grant immunity to defense witnesses, but suggested that there
might be cases in which it would so act. It found no prosecutorial
misconduct, already a basis for relief under Morrison, but then said
that in the absence thereof, the use ofjudicially fashioned immunity
ought not be considered. It confused the rationale for defense witness immunity-that the Constitution required the admission of
"clearly exculpatory evidence"-with the standards governing
81 Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204.
82 611 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1979).

Judge Sloviter wrote the unanimous opinion of
the court in Bacheler, for a panel including Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Gibbons,
who had authored the opinion of the court in Herman.
83 Id. at 449.
84 Id. at 449-50 (citing United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 67 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 980 (1978)). Notably, neither Rocco nor Niederberger limits
its discussion to statutory authority; both speak in more general terms of the courts'
lack of power to confer defense witness immunity.
85 Id. at 450 (citing United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976)).
86 Id. (citations omitted).
87 Id.
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grants of immunity, standards which had not yet been formulated.
In sum, it bore witness to the flux in which Herman had left matters.
Three months later, Smith engendered the court's attempt to answer
these nagging questions. The novel and radical way in which it did
so has not, however, had the salutary effect it anticipated.
V.

THE BREAKTHROUGH:

GOVERNMENT OF THE

VIRGIN ISLANDS V. SMITH

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith8 8 accomplished three
things: it clarified Third Circuit law regarding defense immunity;
it applied the holding of Morrison to a rather compelling set of
facts; and, in what can only be described as dictum, it authorized
district courts to themselves immunize potential defense witnesses under certain circumstances.
The impact of the third accomplishment of Smith was so dramatic that it far overshadowed the first two, which represent the
performance of functions far more typical of, and far more befitting the judiciary. Ironically, had the court again declined to decide the issue of courts' authority to grant defense witness
immunity, Smith nonetheless would have been an important case,
and one far more protective of defendants' rights and generative
of progressive judicial decisions. It is, therefore, necessary to examine Smith in its entirety.
First, the Smith court made sense of Herman by explaining
that, after that decision, there were "two possible situations in
which the due process clause might compel the granting of immunity to defense witnesses." 8 9 The first was the Morrison situation, "where government actions denying use immunity to
defendants were undertaken with the 'deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process.' -90 When this occurs,
the court stated, courts are to "order acquittal unless on retrial
the government grants statutory immunity."' Second, courts
have "inherent authority to effectuate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a judicially fashioned immunity
upon a witness whose testimony is essential to an effective de88 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). Judge Garth, who had dissented in Herman,
wrote the opinion of the court for Judges Weis and Gibbons.
89 Id. at 966.
90 Id. (citing United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)).
91 Id. (citing United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)).
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fense. ' 9 2 Thus, the court clarified that there are two distinct
remedies available to defendants. It then went on to explore the
contours of each.
With respect to the first, the court reiterated and adopted as
doctrine the position of the Herman court on the burden which
defendants must bear in order to avail themselves of what it described as "extraordinary relief."' 93 Accordingly, a defendant
must make an "evidentiary showing" that the government's decision not to provide immunity to a defense witness was made
"with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial factfinding process." 9 4 The court then concluded that aprimafacie show95
ing of such intention had been made in the case at bar.
Smith was a prosecution of four defendants for the robbery
96
of Roy Phipps, who was "slightly retarded" and a poor witness.
Phipps' assailants were members of a group whose precise identities were disputed at trial. Three defendants sought to introduce
the testimony of Ernesto Sanchez, who had admitted his own involvement in the offense, but offered direct testimony exculpating them. Sanchez, however, asserted his fifth amendment
privilege. Although the juvenile authorities responsible for prosecuting him agreed to grant him use immunity, the United States
Attorney never agreed to do so. The Court of Appeals found
that this failure constituted a prima facie showing of a deliberate
intention to distort the judicial factfinding process, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 97 This finding
was based upon the prosecution's knowledge of the weakness of
its case; its efforts to resist the admission of Sanchez's statement
to police, having refused to grant him immunity; and its lack of
justification for refusing to grant such immunity, given the immunity offered by the authorities who were solely responsibile for
prosecuting him. 98
While the Smith court thus reiterated the high standard re92 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191,
1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)).
93 Id. at 968 (quoting United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)).
94 Id. (quoting United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)).

95 Id.

Id. at 969 n.6.
Id. at 969. The court did not define "prima facie" but indicated that the record revealed "government action that might well fall within the guidelines of Morri96
97

son or Herman." Id.
98 Id.
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quired to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct giving rise to
the type of relief allowed in Morrison, it also set a very low threshold for the showing necessary to obtain an evidentiary hearing on
this issue. A prosecution case rendered vulnerable by evidence
which would be inadmissible but for a grant of immunity is not
rare. Similarly, the scope of statutory immunity always reduces
the government's interest in resisting immunity. Thus, Smith
made Morrison hearings easy to come by. Moreover, it also made
clear that "[i]mmunity granted under this theory need not be
predicated upon a finding that witness' testimony is clearly exculpatory or otherwise essential to the defendant's case." 9 9 Rather,
it need only be relevant,' 0 0 a much lower standard. Hence, the
court also eased the requirements for prevailing on this type of
claim.
This beneficial change, however, was overshadowed by the
blockbuster aspect of Smith: that courts could grant judicially
fashioned immunity to a witness whose testimony is essential to
an effective defense. Having already remanded on another
ground, the court need not even have addressed that issue, particularly since, as in Herman, the parties had not included it in
their initial submissions to the court.' 0 ' Nevertheless, the court
reached out to create a new and unique rule of law.
The Third Circuit based its departure from established precedent on authority previewed in Herman. First, it found a constitutional right emanating from Chambers v. Mississippi 102 to have
exculpatory evidence presented to the jury; this in turn emanated
from the "basic constitutional doctrine-that the right to present3
'0
an effective defense inheres in the guarantee of a fair trial."'
Second, it based the remedy necessary to the vindication of this
right-defense witness immunity-on prior cases in which courts
granted witnesses immunity in order to effectuate an otherwise
99 Id. at 969 n.7.
100 Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d at 223, 228 (3d Cir. 1976)).
101 Id. at 970 n.8. The court had ordered supplemental briefs on this issue. Id.
102 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the Supreme Court held that Mississippi's
strict adherence to archaic rules of evidence denied the defendant a fair trial where
they prevented him from introducing trustworthy, exculpatory evidence without
furthering any particular state interest. Id. at 294-303.
103 Smith, 615 F.2d at 971 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to fair trial requires that an indigent defendant be appointed counsel to represent him); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (identity of government
informants must be disclosed where necessary to a fair trial); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense

to assure a fair trial)).
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meaningless constitutional right. 10 4
Having established the existence of this right and the remedy for it, the court recognized that "the unique and affirmative
nature of the immunity remedy and fundamental considerations
of separation of powers" required that "grants of immunity to
defense witnesses . . . be bounded by special safeguards and ...
be made subject to special conditions."' 1 5 In particular, the
court explained that:
immunity must be properly sought in the district court; the
defense witness must be available to testify; the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests
which countervail against a grant of immunity.'0 6
The court proceeded to elaborate on those requirements, emphasizing that the evidence must be "both clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's case. Immunity will be denied if the proffered
testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or if it is found to relate only to the credibility of the government's witnesses."'' 0 7 On the other hand, if the defense makes the
appropriate showing, the government's burden'0 8 of demonstrating
countervailing interests will be difficult to meet, given the many options available to the prosecution. 0 9
104 Id. To this effect, the court cited the following authority: Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (defendant's testimony at a pretrial suppression
hearing, to establish standing under the fourth amendment, cannot be introduced
against him at trial); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir.
1978) (defendant's testimony predicate to speech and debate clause defense may
not be used against him at trial); and United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332-33
(3d Cir. 1978) (defendant's testimony predicate to double jeopardy claim may not
be used against him at a subsequent trial). See also United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d
100, 115 (3d Cir. 1986) (defendant's testimony at pretrial detention hearing may
not be used against him at trial).
Notably, while all of these cases involve judicially created immunity, none involve a grant of immunity to witnesses other than the defendant himself. Their
precedential value should accordingly have been limited.
105 Smith, 615 F.2d at 971-72.
106 Id. at 972 (footnote omitted).
107 Id. (footnote omitted).
108 The Smith court required the defendant to make application to the district
court and to satisfy the court that the witness was available and that his testimony
would be clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense. Id. at 972. At that point,
the burden would shift to the government to persuade the court of the existence of
countervailing interests, if any. Id. at 973.
109 Id. Thus, because the immunity to be granted would be use immunity only, it
would have no impact upon a potential prosecution of a witness against whom the
evidence already has been assembled or will be assembled independent of the witness' testimony. As to witnesses against whom the evidence has not been assembled, the government could seek to postpone the defendant's trial until after that of
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The Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
determination of the two possible claims for immunity, each of
which was found to be sufficiently colorable to require an evidentiary hearing."' Nonetheless, Smith has been viewed as noteworthy
both within... and outside of the Third Circuit'' 2 primarily for the
second type of immunity it made available. Though it claimed to be
in line with precedent established by the Third Circuit" 3 and elsewhere," 4 Smith involved an important break in the law. Indeed, on
its face it established a right and remedy of significance to criminal
defendants. In practice, however, its impact has been minimal, if
not deleterious to persons accused of crimes. That impact, and the
reasons for it, are traced in the section that follows.
VI.
A.

THE IMPACT OF SMITH

In The Third Circuit

The Third Circuit has adhered to Smith although it has limited its scope and refused to apply it to the benefit of even a single criminal defendant: no reported cases have resulted in
reversals for the failure to grant immunity where it should have
been granted. Rather, since Smith, there have been only three
reported Third Circuit decisions addressing the scope of defense
witness immunity. Each has restricted rather than expanded it.
Thus, in United States v. Lowell," 5 the Court of Appeals was
first presented with an opportunity to define and expand the
scope of Smith. Lowell involved allegations of bribery of General
Services Administration (GSA) officials by officers of a government paint supplier who desired to perform their own quality
the witness. Given these options, "[a]ny interest the government may have in withholding immunity . . . would be purely formal, possibly suspect and should not,
without close scrutiny, impede a judicial grant of immunity." Id. (footnote
omitted).
1O Id. at 974.
11 1 See text accompanying infra notes 115-74.
112 See text accompanying infra notes 175-205.
''3
Smith, 615 F.2d at 972 n.11. The court claimed that "[p]rior cases in this
circuit do not preclude this form ofjudicial immunity." Id. (citing United States v.
Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973)). That conclusion, however, proceeds
from an excessively narrow reading of Berrigan, Rocco and Niederberger. Indeed, the
latter two discussed more than mere statutory immunity, while Berrigan undoubtedly would have rejected immunity for "any defense witness," even one satisfying
the Smith criteria.
''4
Id. at 972-73 n.13 (citing United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512 (4th Cir.
1979); United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917
(1979)).
115 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1981).
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control.1 6 The defense wished to call one such GSA official who
had been indicted but pleaded guilty to reduced charges in separate proceedings.' 17 Apparently, the substance of the witness'
proffered testimony was that he received payments from a person
other than defendant Lowell. 1 8 This testimony would have
served both to discredit the testimony of the government's key
to exculpate defendant Lowell of
witness ' 9 and independently
0
the charges against him.12
Nonetheless, the district court and the Third Circuit denied
defendant's request for immunity. In so doing, the latter 12 1 construed Smith narrowly, and to defendants' detriment, in three significant ways. First, although the propriety of granting defense
witness immunity involves the application of established law to
facts, and thus would ordinarily warrant plenary review,' 2 2 the
court indicated its intention to defer to the judgment of district
courts as long as the latter had had "an opportunity to apply the
[Smith] rule to the evidence."' 23 Mere application of the Smith
criteria, apparently, insulated district courts from careful review;
indeed the decision in Smith itself was explained by the fact that
"the district court order vacated in Smith was entered without the
benefit of Herman's immunity discussion." 124
Second, the Lowell court held that, because the government
116 Id. at 952-53. For a detailed account of the facts, see United States v. Lowell,
490 F. Supp. 897, 900 (D.N.J. 1980), aft'd, 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1981).
117 Lowell, 649 F.2d at 953, 955. The GSA official, Joe Montalbano, was permitted to plead guilty to a single conspiracy count. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. at 905. Apparently, violations of the Travel Act with which he was originally charged were
dismissed. Lowell, 649 F.2d at 953 n. 1.
118 Lowell, 649 F.2d at 955. Montalbano would have testified that he received
payments from a different company official, Thomas Accamonda. Id. at 955, 961.
119 See id. at 953-55. This witness, Dennis Tepperman, testified that he personally
gave defendant Lowell money with which to bribe Mr. Montalbano. Id. at 954. Mr.
Tepperman's testimony was the sole basis for linking defendant Lowell to the conspiracy. Id. at 953-54. To the extent that Lowell did not personally bribe
Montalbano, Tepperman's testimony would appear to be discredited by
Montalbano's proffer. Id. at 954-55.
120 Obviously, the evidence against Lowell would be far weaker if he did not pay
the bribe monies at issue.
121 Judge Rosenn wrote the opinion of the court for a panel that also included
Chief Judge Seitz andJudge Sloviter. Id. at 951-52.
122 See, e.g., United States v. Terselich, No. 88-3687, slip op. at 5 (3d Cir. Sept. 1,
1989) (citing Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d 173, 175 (3d. Cir. 1986)); McCandless
v. Beyer, 835 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d
1099, 1106 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906 (1986)); Universal Minerals,
Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102-03 (3d Cir. 1981).
123 Lowell, 649 F.2d at 964-65.
124 Id. at 964 n.23. Thus viewed, Smith loses much of its precedential impact.
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"may yet prosecute Montalbano [the prospective defense witness],"' 2 5 its failure to grant him immunity could not be viewed
as evidencing a "deliberate intention of distorting the fact finding
process." 1 26 Yet, the likelihood of prosecuting Montalbano further was in fact very minimal: the defense proposed to ask him
questions limited to a scheme as to which he had already pleaded
guilty, and there was no evidence that he had engaged in other
illegalities for which he might be charged. 127 Rather,
Montalbano's potential exposure came from the unrealistic possibilities that he would either be prosecuted for tax evasion, 1 28 or
some other yet uncharged offense in another jurisdiction, or that
he would withdraw his guilty plea at some later point. '2 9 Entirely
hypothetical, neither of these unrealistic concerns has justified a
governmental decision not to grant immunity to an important defense witness. Moreover, they should not have sufficed to
demonstrate the "state's countervailing interests" necessary to
overcome a legitimate claim for defense witness immunity under
Smith. Hence, the court's decision in Lowell dramatically reduced
the burden that must be borne by the government in opposing a
Smith claim.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Lowell court held
that defendant's Smith claim should be denied because the testimony to be offered by defense witness Montalbano "would not in
itself exonerate Lowell," as Sanchez's testimony in Smith would
have exonerated the defendants therein. 3 ° The court thus deId. at 965.
Id.
127 See id. at 959-61.
The district court noted that Montalbano's testimony
"might well have subjected him to additional federal prosecution on other counts
or to state prosecution for offenses arising from the same series of transactions."
Lowell, 490 F. Supp. at 905. The Court of Appeals agreed. Lowell, 647 F.2d at 961
("[O]f course, Montalbano may have been indictable for any [other] pay off
schemes he may have participated in ... , with or without the participation of Lowell."). While this hypothetical may, as the court concluded, justify finding that
Montalbano retained a fifth amendment privilege, the "generous" standard applicable to that inquiry is not an appropriate basis upon which to deny Smith immunity. Id. at 963 (citation omitted). For that, the government must demonstrate its
"countervailing interests," which lie in an intended and not merely a potential
prosecution. See id. at 963-64. Montalbano's plea, as a practical matter, made further prosecution of him unlikely.
128 Id. at 955, 961. Montalbano's exposure to tax-related charges stemmed from
boilerplate language in every plea agreement to the effect that such agreement does
not include this type of charges within its scope. Nonetheless, such charges are
rarely brought.
129 See Lowell, 490 F. Supp. at 905.
130 Lowell, 649 F.2d at 965 (emphasis in original).
125
126
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fined the term "clearly exculpatory" in a radically limited manner. Such a definition was not supported by the rule stated in
Smith, which omitted ambiguous or cumulative testimony, as well
as testimony relating only to the credibility of a government witness. 3 ' Nor is it supported by the facts of Smith: Sanchez's testimony might not have been believed 132 and was not in itself
exculpatory absent additional testimony that the defendants did
not have the nicknames of the persons alleged by Sanchez to be
involved. 3 ' Indeed, the Lowell decision is unsupported by any
case law and restricts the Smith rule to that rare case where a single witness comes forward to exculpate a defendant who would
otherwise be found guilty. Though this may occur in episodes of
Perry Mason, it does not ring true in real life.
Lowell invokes the "unique and affirmative nature of the immunity remedy and fundamental considerations of separation of
powers" in "declin[ing] to extend further the rule announced in
Smith."' 134 Far from an extension, Lowell heralds a retreat from
the letter and spirit of Smith. In subsequent cases, this retreat has
continued apace.
Thus, in United States v. Steele, 13 5 the Third Circuit further

contracted the definition of "clearly exculpatory" by finding
"ambiguous" a proffer of defense testimony which would have
"vitiat[ed] the relevance of the government's evidence."' 136
Hence, while the government was attempting to prove that the
course of dealing between two persons constituted commercial
bribery,' 37 the proposed defense witness 138 could have testified
131 Id. at 964 (citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F,2d 964 (3d
Cir. 1980)). Smith makes clear that evidence must be "both clearly exculpatory and
essential to the defendant's case." Evidence that is "ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or ... found to relate only to the credibility of the government's
witnesses" fails this test. Id.
132 Indeed, the Lowell court itself expressed concern that co-conspirators will
"whitewash" each other through the use of testimony unchallengeable for one reason or another. Id. at 962 (citing United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775-76
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); United States v. LaDuca, 447 F.
Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979)). Why this concern applied to
Montalbano but not Sanchez was left unexplored by the court.
133 Smith, 615 F.2d at 966-67.
134 Lowell, 649 F.2d at 965 (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith,
615 F.2d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1980)).
135 685 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982). The opinion of the
court in Steele was written by Judge Aldisert, for a panel also including Judges Weis
and Becker. Id. at 797.
136 Id. at 808.
137 Steele was, in essence, a bid-rigging case. The defendants were charged with
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that, in fact those parties "had entered into other transactions," 139 which were legitimate. Holding that because "[t]he defendant's proffer did not indicate that [the witness] would
directly connect the payments in question to any other transaction," it was "ambiguous and not clearly exculpatory," 4 0 the
Court of Appeals effectively prevented the defendants from
building a circumstantial defense. In this sense, Steele too constricted Smith, if only slightly. The trend, however, is both unmistakable and disturbing.
Finally, the Court of Appeals, while declining the opportunity to overrule Smith in an en banc hearing, refused yet a third
time to apply it in favor of a defendant. Thus, in United States v.
Bazzano, 14 1 the court affirmed a district court's denial of defense
witness immunity for two prospective witnesses who could have
directly exculpated a defendant charged with gambling, in violation of his probation. 142 First, the Court held that "[t]here was
no evidence of any attempt on the part of the prosecution to distort the facts of the case by keeping [witnesses] Stagno and Fimmano from testifying." 14 3 Hence, although their testimony would
have been uniquely probative, and no reason was given for the
government's decision not to immunize them, 14 4 the Bazzano
court upheld the district court's determination that Morrison immunity was inappropriate. In so doing, however, it refused to
apply the analysis adopted in Smith. Instead, the court construed
prosecutorial misconduct not to include the misconduct specifically emanating from the failure to grant immunity and thus remail and wire fraud, among other offenses, for their participation in a scheme to
insure that General Electric would receive the contract for a Puerto Rico Water
Resources Authority project. Id. at 797-801.
138 Id. The witness, Charles Mothon, was actually a named defendant in the case.
It is puzzling that this was not the basis for the court's opinion, as it evidences the
government's actual intention to prosecute Mothon, and a correspondingly compelling reason not to grant him immunity. Indeed, severance appears to have been
the relief necessary and preliminary to any defense witness immunity argument. Id.
See supra note 14.
'39 Id. at 808.
140 Id.
141 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984).
142 The residence where the evidence of defendant's gambling activity was seized
was that of one witness, Donna Stagno. Id. The other witness,Jerry Fimmano, also
lived there. Id. at 828. They were thus uniquely situated to exculpate the defendant, Primo V. Mollica. Id. Indeed, the handwriting on the betting slips seized was
apparently Fimmano's. Id. at 840 n.6.
143 Id. at 840 (footnote omitted).
144 No prosecution of either Fimmano or Stagno appears to have been contemplated and there is no record of one having occurred.
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quired a type of misconduct that was neither required in Smith
nor proven in Morrison.14 5 Secondly, notwithstanding the submission of an affidavit asserting that witness Fimmano would
have exculpated the defendant, the court held that the defendant
"clearly failed to make 'an application . . . to the district court
naming the proposed witness and specifying the particulars of
the witness' testimony.' "146 Hence, it invoked a procedural barrier to the type of relief afforded by Smith.
While perhaps not unjustified, the court's action in Bazzano
revealed its determination to limit Smith as narrowly as possible
and perhaps even to leave it a toothless remedy. Indeed, at least
one Third Circuit judge questioned the continued vitality of
Smith, arguing that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy,' 4 7 Smith may have "expanded judicial
power too far." ' 48 Rather than overruling it, however, the court
left Smith emasculated and vulnerable both to attack and to conservative interpretation. That interpretation, or attack, inevitably
followed, in the district courts of the Circuit as well as in other
Courts of Appeals.
B.

In the District Courts of The Third Circuit

Another measure of Smith's weakness as precedent is the
manner in which it has been viewed by lower courts bound by law
to adhere to its mandates. Thus, Smith's lack of generative power
is evident when viewed through the lens of published decisions 4 9 of the United States District Courts in the Third Circuit.
These cases fail to elaborate the requirements of Smith or to de150
velop its doctrine further. At times, they ignore the decision.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
147 459 U.S. 248 (1983).
148 712 F.2d at 851 (Adams, J., dissenting) (citing Pillbury Co. v. Conboy, 459
U.S. 248, 261 (1983)). In Bazzano, Judge Garth argued that in the event a violation
of probation hearing predates a criminal trial regarding the same charges, the probationer ought to be granted use immunity to testify in the former. Id. at 838
(Garth, J., dissenting). A majority of the court declined to adopt this rule, calling
into further question the generative power of Smith. See id. at 829 nn.2-3. But see
United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 115 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986).
149 Of course, published decisions may or may not reflect typical district court
decision-making. They are, however, the body of data available. Moreover, to the
extent that they represent district court efforts to elaborate or extend judicial doctrine, their paucity in this area reveals how little Smith has been elaborated or
extended.
150 See United States v. Osticco, 580 F. Supp. 484, 487-88 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 738
F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1984).
145

146
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Unanimously, they reject defense arguments in favor of immunity. 5 ' Seizing upon one or another of Smith's rigorous requirements, they reveal how very little Smith changed the law.' 5 '
Where they attempt to expand Smith, they are quickly disciplined
by the Court of Appeals. In sum, Smith has simply not taken
hold.
In part, it has not taken hold because of district courts' continuing unfamiliarity with Smith. Thus, as recently as 1984, a federal district court in the Middle District of Pennsylvania stated
that "no conclusory decision from the Third Circuit has been
forthcoming on whether the government must immunize a codefendant who has invoked his fifth amendment privilege on the
witness stand."' 1 53 Although this question is related to that addressed by Smith and is clearly addressed by Smith's progeny, 54 it
was not subjected to Smith's analysis. 55 This type of treatment
casts doubt on the weight and importance of the Smith decision.
More frequently, district courts interpret Smith stringently.
Defense applications are routinely denied for failure to specify
the content of proposed exculpatory evidence in sufficient detail,' 5 6 or to obtain a proffer in the proper form. 15 7 The termi151 See United States v. Sampson, 661 F. Supp. 514 (W.D. Pa. 1987); United
States v. Osticco, 580 F. Supp. 484 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 738 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1984);
United States v. Nolan, 523 F. Supp. 1235 (W.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Stout,
499 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980); United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
152 The district courts of the Third Circuit had also unanimously rejected claims
of defense witness immunity prior to Smith. See United States v. Kozell, 468 F.
Supp. 746, 749 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Standefer, 452 F. Supp. 1178,
1189-90 (W.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Panetta, 436 F. Supp. 114, 127 n.27
(E.D. Pa. 1977), aft'd, 568 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Jones, 404 F.
Supp. 529, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912, 930-31 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in part, revd in part, 482
F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1972).
153 Osticco, 580 F. Supp. at 487.
154 See United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793, 808 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 908 (1982).
155 In Osticco, Judge Caldwell did mention, without citing authority, that he was
denying relief at least in part because there had been no showing that "the government's decision not to seek immunity for [the defense witness] resulted from a deliberate intention to frustrate the fact finding process or to prevent testimony that
was essential to Osticco's defense." Osticco, 580 F. Supp. at 488. However, this was
not couched in terms of either type of analysis described in Smith.
156 See United States v. Nolan, 523 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (motion
for defense witness immunity denied because of the generality with which it was
made); United States v. Stout, 499 F. Supp. 605, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (motion denied because of conclusory nature of proffer); United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp.
412, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (testimony of proposed defense witness not "clearly
identified").
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nology of the Smith rule, where interpreted at all,' 5 8 is construed
in as narrow a fashion as possible. Thus, in United States v. Sampson,' 5 9 Judge Diamond interpreted "clearly exculpatory" so as to
include within its scope only such evidence as is reliable enough
to render an acquittal "a probable certainty," or at least a "reasonable probability." 61 Similarly, he defined "essential" so as to
preclude a grant of immunity for testimony that could be obtained from the defendant herself, notwithstanding her constitutional right not to testify.' 6 ' And he found a governmental
interest sufficient to overcome an immunity claim even where
such interest was "arguable" or a "mere 'possibility'," irrespec162
tive of the necessity of the testimony at issue.
Hence, the terminological interstices left by Smith have all
too willingly been filled by district courts in a manner that defeats
the purpose of the original decision. Moreover, even where trial
courts have interpreted the Smith decision favorably to defendants, they have nonetheless hesitated to grant the immunity
157 See Stout, 499 F. Supp. at 606 (declaration of counsel insufficient); Shober, 489
F. Supp. at 415-16 (declaration of counsel insufficient). See also Nolan, 523 F. Supp.
at 1240 (written proffer required).
158 Smith has been criticized by lower courts for leaving such key terms as "prima
facie showing" or "convincing showing" undefined. See Shober, 489 F. Supp. at 416.
It has also been criticized for failing to specify what is meant by "clearly exculpatory" or "essential." United States v. Sampson, 661 F. Supp. 514, 518 (W.D. Pa.
1987).
159 661 F. Supp. 514 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
160 Id. at 519. Judge Diamond derived these definitions from United States v.
Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 965 (3d Cir. 1981) (defendant must show a "probable certainty" that immunized testimony would completely exonerate him) and from
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (prejudice to a defendant from
ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when there is a "reasonable probability"
that effective assistance of counsel would have changed the result of the proceeding). Sampson, 661 F. Supp. at 519. Whatever the definition, he concluded that the
testimony "must be much more than evidence that has some tendency to negate an
element of the government's case." Id.
In assessing whether it is sufficiently exculpatory, Judge Diamond also required
that the reliability of the evidence be evaluated by considering the circumstances
under which it comes to light, whether it is corroborated, the credibility of the witness and the relationship between the witness and the defendant. Id. at 519-22
(immunity not granted because testimony given by a husband with a prior record
on behalf of his wife). See also United States v. Stout, 499 F. Supp. 605, 607 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (reliability depends upon the timing of the statement and whether such
timing evidences a purpose of obtaining immunity).
161 Sampson, 661 F. Supp. at 520 n.4.
162 Id. at 520-21. Only governmental interests which are "merely formal" or
"possibly suspect" can be disregarded in favor of an immunity grant. Otherwise,
strong government interests automatically forbid any grant of judicial immunity.
Id. at 520 (citing United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981)).
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sought. Thus, while Judge Teitelbaum, in United States v. Nolan, 16 3 noted that "immunity is generally costless to the government" since "it may be possible to prosecute a witness
independently of any testimony actually given," 164 he denied the
defense application, noting that countervailing government interests might arise.' 65 And, while Judge Troutman went to great
lengths to explicate the constitutional necessity of allowing defendants to move for defense witness immunity pretrial, 166 in
United States v. Shober, 167 he denied such motion pending the evidence to be adduced at trial. 168 Finally, those interpretations of
Smith favorable to defendants have, to a great extent been eviscerated by subsequent decisions of the Third Circuit. Judge
Troutman's holding, for example, that a particular witness might
become clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense depending upon the testimony of a key government witness 169 would
seem to fail in the wake of Lowell's mandate that evidence useful
to attack the credibility of such a witness does not fall within the
scope of Smith.' 7 °
Most significantly, however, the district courts have continually misinterpreted the first prong of Smith, emanating from Morrison. Universally, the courts have required actual "prosecutorial
misconduct," in the form of, for example, interference with access to the witnesses in question. 7 ' Distracted by Smith's requirement that the defense show prosecutorial actions taken with
1 72
the deliberate intention of distorting the fact-finding process,
523 F. Supp. 1235 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
Id. at 1240 (citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973
(3d Cir. 1980)).
165 Id. at 1240 n.2. Similarly, while Judge Teitelbaum found that where "the determination of guilt will hinge on the credibility of the defendant," corroborative
testimony might be sufficiently "essential" to satisfy that prong of the Smith analysis, he would not determine whether certain evidence was essential "until that point
in the trial is reached." Id. at 1240.
166 United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412, 417-18 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
167 489 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
163
164

168 Id. at 418-19.
169 Id. In Shober, a key government witness' testimony might, depending upon its
content, have been contradicted by the defense witness for whom immunity was
sought. That witness' testimony would otherwise have been irrelevant to the case.
Id. Nonetheless, Judge Troutman found that his testimony might become clearly
exculpatory and essential to the defense case. Id.
170 See text accompanying supra notes 130-33.
171 See Shober, 489 F. Supp. at 416. See also United States v. Sampson, 661 F.
Supp. 514, 517 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1987); United States v. Osticco, 580 F. Supp. 484,
488 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 738 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Nolan, 523 F.
Supp. 1235, 1239 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
172 Osticco, 580 F. Supp. at 488; Shober, 489 F. Supp. at 415.
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these courts have failed to focus on the justification for the government's decision not to grant defense witness immunity, which
constituted the true basis for the remand in Smith.' 7 3 It is, perhaps, in this sense that Smith has done the greatest disservice: it
has re-focused lower court attention on judicially created immunity at the expense of statutory immunity, and burdened the former with an unfortunately worded, 1 74 conservative standard.
District court interpretations of Smith thus reveal not only
the weakness and lack of generative power of that decision, but
also demonstrate where the Smith court went wrong. This manifest when one sees the direction in which other Circuits, lacking
and often renouncing a Smith-type decision, have gone. It is to
those Circuits that we now turn.
C.

In the Other Circuits

Finally, Smith's lack of generative power is demonstrated by
the fact that it has not been followed in a single other Circuit: no
Court of Appeals outside the Third Circuit has held that a court
has the authority to grant immunity to prospective defense witnesses. Indeed, of the eleven circuits that have addressed the
question subsequent to Smith, five have expressly rejected this aspect of the Smith holding. 75 Concerned with problems of separation of powers, of appropriate limitation of the judicial role and
of potential abuse by defendants or their witnesses, these Circuits
have been explicit in their criticism of Smith and have expressly
See text accompanying supra notes 93-100.
Smith went out of its way to emphasize "the unique and affirmative nature of
the immunity remedy," Smith, 615 F.2d at 971, which it described as "extraordinary
relief," id. at 968, and mandated be "clearly limited." Id. at 972. District courts
have seized upon this overly cautious language in denying relief to defendants seeking immunity for prospective witnesses. See, e.g., Sampson, 661 F. Supp. at 517-18.
175 The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly rejected
Smith. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[W]e
find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with the standards outlined in
[Smith]."), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); Autry v. Estelle, 706 F.2d 1394, 140002 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e differ with the Third Circuit . .. in our unwillingness to
find judicial authority to immunize witnesses."), reh 'g denied, 712 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.
1983); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Despite the
Third Circuit's holding to the contrary, we conclude that federal courts do not have
power [to immunize witnesses]."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); United States
v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 1982) ("[We] conclude that courts have no
power to independently fashion witness use immunity."); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 1524 n.7 (11 th Cir.) (District courts may not grant immunity
to a defense witness simply because that witness possesses essential exculpatory
information unavailable from other sources.), reh 'g denied, 729 F.2d 1468 (11 th Cir.
1984).
173
174
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denied applications for judicial grants of defense witness immunity that would have been cognizable under Smith. 17 6 Other Circuits have simply refused to follow Smith, rejecting the notion of
judicially-created immunity and adopting other doctrinal solutions to the problem while nonetheless acknowledging the existence of Smith.' 7 7 Finally, one Circuit has not had the opportunity
to address the problem since Smith,' 7 8 while another has left the
question open in the face of the inapplicability of Smith to any
79
facts presented to it. 1
Hence, Smith has had no effect on the jurisprudence of the
nation's eleven other Circuit Courts of Appeals and remains a
lone voice in the wilderness of defense witness immunity. This
does not, however, mean that these courts have not had the opportunity to address the problem confronted by Smith. Rather,
they have developed their own doctrinal solutions to that problem. Ironically, those solutions are often more favorable to defendants in certain respects than are the standards developed by
Smith, as they have been interpreted. Moreover, they are more
credible and have been applied with more force, because they do
not require the departure from precedent and leap of logic contained in Smith.
Thus, for example, the Eighth Circuit has adhered to its position established before Smith 0 that district courts lack the
176 This does not mean that relief would necessarily have been granted had these
courts adopted Smith. See, e.g., Pennell, 737 F.2d at 529; Estelle, 706 F.2d at 1401;
United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 582-83 n.6 (1st Cir. 1981).
177 The District of Columbia, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have followed
this approach. See, e.g., United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1283 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982), United States v. Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d
564, 568 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hardrich, 707 F.2d 992, 993-94 (8th Cir.
1983); United States v. Brutzman, 731 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1984).
178 The Fourth Circuit has not published an opinion on the issue of defense immunity since United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980). Klauber made clear the Fourth Circuit's position that courts lack
the power to confer immunity, but recognized that prosecutorial misconduct attendant to the process of granting immunity might require redress. Id. at 517-18
(citing United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (precluding immunized testimony on
behalf of the government unless immunity also made available to prospective defense witnesses)).
179 The First Circuit has repeatedly left open the issue "of when, if ever, due
process might require immunization of defense witnesses," while acknowledging
that Smith sets forth "the most lenient rule regarding court-ordered immunization
of defense witnesses." Flaherty, 668 F.2d at 582-83 n.6.
18o See United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1315 (8th Cir. 1977) (the power
to apply for immunity "is the sole prerogative of the Government").
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power to grant immunity to prospective defense witnesses.' 8 '
Nonetheless, it has hinted that the failure of the government to
grant immunity to a witness whose testimony would be exculpa-

tory might require relief by the court.' 82 This standard is far less
onerous than that existing in the Third Circuit after Smith and its
progeny: it requires only that the evidence suppressed by the failure to grant immunity be "clearly exculpatory."'' 8 3 Moreover,
because it grows out of unfair government action instead of the

court's fictitious power to itself grant immunity, it is firmly
grounded in constitutional and statutory precedent and will thus

likely have a generative power that Smith has always lacked.' 84

Other Circuits, proceeding in a similarly gradual manner
and focusing on traditional notions of the prosecution's obligations, have nonetheless imposed less burdensome standards
upon defendants seeking relief for the failure of the government
to grant immunity to defense witnesses than are imposed by the

Third Circuit under Smith and its progeny. Thus, while Smith has
had the effect of limiting judicially imposed relief to truly extraordinary circumstances and of almost eliminating the circumstances under which relief stems from prosecutorial misconduct,
other Circuits have refused to develop the former but have liberalized the latter. For example, the Second Circuit has held that
courts may order the government to immunize defense witnesses

where "the government has engaged in discriminatory use of im181 Graham has been followed in post-Smith cases in the Eighth Circuit. See United
States v. Eagle Hawk, 815 F.2d 1213, 1217 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
712 (1988); United States v. Hardrich, 707 F.2d 992, 994 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 991 (1983). See also United States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir.
1987) (following Graham without citing it).
182 Hardrich, 707 F.2d at 994 n.3 ("Nor did failure of the Government to grant
immunity [to a defense witness] deprive defendant of a fair trial. Because the testimony was not exculpatory, defendant was not prejudiced by its exclusion."). Hardrich evolved, in part, from Judge Bright's dissent in a previous case. See United
States v. Saettele, 585 F.2d 307, 310-14 (8th Cir. 1978) (Bright, J., dissenting).
Judge Bright recognized that "the authority to seek immunity under section 6002
can be exercised only by the prosecutor." Id. at 312 (Bright, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original). However, he argued that courts should act where that authority is exercised in a one-sided manner, for example, when immunity is granted to government but not defense witnesses, or where there is no reason to deny immunity to
the latter. Id. at 313 & n.5 (Bright, J., dissenting).
183 Doddington, 822 F.2d at 821 n.1; Eagle Hawk, 815 F.2d at 1217. These cases
speak in terms of "judicial immunity" but their origins, and the exposition in Doddington, make clear that the exercise of such power depends upon some form of
prosecutorial misconduct, such as selectivity in granting immunity.
184 Neither the Eighth Circuit nor a district court within it has had the opportunity to apply these teachings to a concrete set of facts. Hence, this generative
power is purely speculative.
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munity to gain a tactical advantage or, through its own overreaching has forced the witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment; and
...the witness' testimony will be material, exculpatory and not
cumulative and is not obtainable from any other source.' "85
Hence, the Second Circuit, while refusing to allow courts to
grant immunity on their own, 18 6 has made clear that one need
not show prosecutorial misconduct of the sort demonstrated in
Morrison to require the government to grant immunity. Rather
the "discriminatory use of immunity to gain a tactical advantage," a much lesser showing, will suffice.
The Seventh Circuit standard is more liberal still. While also
adhering to the view "that federal courts do not have the power
to grant immunity to a witness,"' 8 7 that court has nonetheless
held that "[i]n an appropriate case the refusal of the government
to immunize a defense witness might be at once so damaging to
the defense and so unjustifiable in terms of legitimate governmental objectives that the refusal to grant immunity would be a
denial of due process of law to the defendant, and preclude his
conviction."' 8 8 The Seventh Circuit has thus evolved its doctrine
such that the government intention to distort the judicial factfinding process required by its earlier cases can be demonstrated
simply by failing adequately to justify a refusal to grant immunity.
This holding, while not contrary to Smith, goes well beyond the
law as it now seems to exist in the Third Circuit.'
Other Circuits have hinted, if not held, that a showing less
than that required under Smith might satisfy the "prosecutorial
misconduct" prerequisite to relief for the failure to provide defense witness immunity. Thus, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits
have hinted that such relief might be available where the government has immunized witnesses for its own benefit but refused
185 United States v. Shandell, 800 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1174 (1983)). See also United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 174 (1988); United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1025
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1021 (1985).
186 See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
1077 (1981).
187 United States v. Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted). See also United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983); United States v. Frans, 697 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983); United States v. Buonos, 693 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975)).
188 Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d at 568 (citations omitted).
189 See text accompanying supra notes 115-74.
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defense requests for immunity,1 90 a position taken by the District
of Columbia Circuit even before Smith 191 but never adopted in
the Third Circuit. And the Sixth Circuit described the "deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact-finding process" standard adopted by the Third Circuit as more restrictive perhaps,
than the standard it would apply. 19 2 Hence, these courts, too,
while refusing to allow courts to grant defense witness immunity,1 9 3 have nonetheless evolved standards for proper
prosecutorial behavior that might benefit defendants more frequently than they are benefitted in the Third Circuit.
Similarly, while the Third Circuit has cut back Smith by limiting defense witness immunity to those circumstances in which no
conceivable prosecution could be brought against a prospective
defense witness, 194 other circuits, in evaluating the prosecution's
motives in denying immunity seem to require a far greater showing of government interest. Thus, the District of Columbia and
Second Circuits mandate that applications for immunity be denied "whenever the witness for whom immunity is sought is an
actual or potential target of prosecution;"' 9 5 "where the witness
is not an indicted defendant and the prosecutor cannot or prefers
not to present any claim that the witness is a potential defend190 See, e.g., United States v. Brutzman, 731 F.2d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 518-19 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
908 (1980).
Notably, in arriving at his conclusion that prosecutorial misconduct can be inferred from the lack of a governmental interest in refusing defense witness immunity, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit relied in part upon two Ninth Circuit
cases. See Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d at 568 (citing United States v. Patterson, 819
F.2d 1495, 1506 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th
Cir. 1983)). While Lord, in fact, reversed a conviction on these grounds, neither
expressly adopted the liberal standard for which Judge Posner cited it. HerreraMedina, 853 F.2d at 568.
191 Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 921 (1967).
192 United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960, 963 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929
(1980).
193 The District of Columbia, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits all continue to
deny applications for judicially-created immunity. See United States v. Pennell, 737
F.2d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); United States v.
Mendia, 731 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984); Klauber,
611 F.2d at 517; United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
194 See supra text accompanying notes 125-29, 144, 162.
195 United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 926 (1982) (quoting United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1077 (1981)) (footnote omitted). See also United States
v. Shandell, 800 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1986).

1989]

DEFENSE IMMUNITY

673

ant, '"196 immunity ought to be considered. 19 7 In this respect too,
then, the Third Circuit's more liberal doctrine yields more conservative results.
Finally, no other Circuit has held, as the Third Circuit has,
that defense witness immunity requires a showing that the testimony to be offered will, in and of itself, exonerate a defendant. 198
Rather, these Circuits have conditioned such immunity on a
showing that such testimony is "clearly exculpatory,"'199 "relevant '"200 or "material, exculpatory and not cumulative, '"201 or that
its exclusion will be "so damaging to the defense" as to constitute a denial of due process.2 °2 Hence, while reversal of a district
court's decision in those Circuits might depend upon a showing
of prejudice such that the failure to grant immunity was not
harmless error, 2 ° ' none would require the district court to make
204
that determination in advance. Yet, the Third Circuit does so
and in this respect too, undermines its own doctrine and blunts
the positive force of Smith.
To be sure, there are circuits which have to date rejected any
196 Turkish, 623 F.2d at 778. This determination is necessarily made on a case-bycase basis. Heidi, 668 F.2d at 1283 n.85.
197 Significantly, though, these circuits place the burden of showing a potential
prosecution on the defendant; the Third Circuit does not. See text accompanying
supra notes 108-09.
198 See text accompanying supra notes 130-33, 140, 160-61.
199 This is the standard applied in the Eighth Circuit. See supra text accompanying notes 180-84. It is also the standard that has been applied, arguendo, in the
Sixth and First Circuits. See United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 529 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566,
582-83 n.6 (1st Cir. 1981). The District of Columbia Circuit seems to apply a "substantially exculpatory" standard. Heidi, 668 F.2d at 1284-85.
200 Relevance seems to be the standard adopted in the Ninth Circuit, allowing for
immunity even where the evidence to be introduced is merely corroborative.
United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983).
201 This is the standard applied in the Second Circuit, see supra text accompanying
note 185, which also requires that the testimony not be obtainable from any other
source. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits appear to agree, at least arguendo, that the
introduction of cumulative evidence does not justify immunity. See United States v.
Brutzman, 731 F.2d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d
512, 519 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980). The District of Columbia
Circuit, however, agrees that immunity ought not be granted if the same evidence
can be garnered without it. Heidi, 668 F.2d at 1286.
202 This is the standard applied in the Seventh Circuit. See supra text accompanying note 188.
203 See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Increasingly, the
Supreme Court has utilized a harmess error analysis in determining whether deprivations of Sixth Amendment rights require the reversal of convictions. See, e.g.,
Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S.Ct. 1792 (1988) (right to consult with counsel); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (right of confrontation).
204 See supra text accompanying notes 130-33, 140, 160-61, 198.
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judicial role in the immunity process. °5 These Circuits have not
only rejected Smith, but have thus far refused to develop any jurisprudence of defense witness immunity. In contrast to these
Circuits, the Third has been a progressive voice. In contrast to
the others, however, the progressiveness of the Third Circuit
seems an illusion: despite the solicitousness of the Smith court for
the rights of defendants, the more conservative evolution of doctrine in other Circuits has yielded more helpful and less vulnerable results.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Defense attorneys had reason to celebrate the decision of the
Third Circuit in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith. On its
face, it empowered defendants as they had never been empowered before. By its terms, it created a remedy for the compulsory
process rights afforded by the Sixth Amendment which had never
existed before.
In practice, however, Smith has benefitted criminal defendants but little. No federal case has been reported granting immunity to a prospective defense witness under the rules set forth in
Smith. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has interpreted Smith so conservatively as to render it practically a dead
letter. District courts within the circuit have construed its requirements so narrowly as to eviscerate the effect of the decision.
And Courts of Appeals elsewhere have rejected Smith, either explicitly or by adopting alternative doctrine in the face of Smith's
holding.
Why has Smith been so lacking in generative power? In part,
the profundity of the problem which Smith sought to solve is responsible for its weakness. The conflict addressed by Smith, between sixth amendment rights and the separation of powers, is
very real and very thorny of resolution. Thus, perhaps, Smith has
205 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that, while judicially created immunity does not exist, it might be appropriate in the event of governmental abuse in
the handling of the immunity process. Thus far, those courts have declined to ar-

ticulate what type of abuse would trigger such relief or to explain what relief that
would be. See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1506-07 (11 th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1069 (1987); United States v. Whittington, 783 F.2d
1210, 1220 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); United States v. Thevis, 665
F.2d 616, 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1008 (1982). The Tenth Circuit has
also rejected the notion ofjudicial immunity and has thus far expressed no opinion

as to when, if ever, prosecutorial misconduct might require either a grant of immunity to defense witnesses or any related relief. United States v. Hunter, 672 F.2d
815, 818 (10th Cir. 1982).

1989]

DEFENSE IMMUNITY

675

not been followed simply because reasonable minds can and do
differ when it comes to "hard cases." If this is so, then although
Smith stands alone, we ought nonetheless to applaud the Smith
court for its courage in attempting to give meaning to our constitutional protections.
The unanimity of the negative response to Smith, however,
demands further analysis. Courageous decisions, even if controversial, yield some following; rarely is a doctrine that sounds so
good rejected so thoroughly. Why has Smith been subjected to
such obloquy?
First, Smith was a radical departure. Though it failed to recognize it, the Smith court not only ventured where no other court
had been, but in fact, intruded upon territory previously recognized by every court, including the Third Circuit, as off limits.
Moreover, it did so without following the appropriate procedures
for overruling prior precedent, 20 6 though it had earlier recognized that en banc review would be required. In these respects,
the Smith court, which was substantively expanding the judicial
role beyond established limits, procedurally abandoned its judicial role as well. Flouting principles of stare decisis and mechanisms existing to effectuate those principles, the Smith court
eschewed the type of incremental change which characterizes a
common law system in favor of a giant doctrinal leap. In this
sense, Smith was built upon a shaky foundation. It is accordingly
not surprising that as those responsible for its maintenance have
changed, the structure has begun to crumble.
Second, however, disingenuous as its treatment of its precedent may have been, the Smith court was honest about the length
of the leap it took. Having built a strong case only a few months
before against the relief sought by the defendants in Smith, the
court could not help but recognize the extraordinariness of the
step it was taking. Thus, it acknowledged "the unique and affirmative nature" of the "extraordinary relief" which it created.
Moreover, it set forth "special safeguards" by which such relief
was to be bounded and "special conditions" to which it would be
subject. By virtue of the tone of its opinion, the court thus discouraged granting the immunity it was authorizing. By virtue of
the content of the rules it promulgated, future courts were left
with bases upon which to deny defense applications for such immunity. And by virtue of the language of those rules, the courts
were left free to interpret Smith to the detriment of the defend206
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ants whose rights the Third Circuit intended to vindicate. In
sum, the Court of Appeals not only departed from its judicial
role, but also pointed out that it was doing so; simultaneously, it
left courts with the option not to follow its lead.
Third, and most significantly, the holding of Smith was unnecessary. Smith could and should have been decided based
solely upon the impropriety of the government's failure to grant
Ernesto Sanchez immunity. A decision along these lines would
have been consistent with Third Circuit precedent and harmonious with the law of other circuits as it existed before and has developed since. It would have been substantively consistent with
the judicial function of passing on the constitutionality of government action. And it would have been procedurally consistent
with the judicial function of respecting precedent and deciding
only those issues necessary of resolution.
Moreover, the court could have so decided Smith while still
expanding defendants' rights. Indeed, the law in other circuits is
at least arguably better for defendants than is the holding in
Smith, as interpreted. In departing from that law, the Third Circuit constricted the availability of relief for this sort of
prosecutorial misconduct, requiring a deliberate intention to distort the factfinding process where such a requirement did not exist before. And, although the facts of Smith hint at a liberalization
of this standard, that portion of the opinion was overshadowed
by the spectacular change in the law that emanated from the remainder of the opinion. Subsequent cases have ignored the former and denied relief looking through the lens of the latter.
Smith is perhaps best viewed, then, as a missed opportunitybut an opportunity to expand and clarify Morrison rather than to
invent new law. Smith could have required the government to
grant defense witnesses immunity where due process demands it,
or risk dismissal, all subject to harmless error analysis upon appellate review. Had it done so, it would have served defendants
better by setting standards they could meet. It would have assured that they would sometimes meet those standards by confining them within established jurisprudence, accessible, familiar
and comfortable to other courts. And it would have stayed within
its judicial role, incrementally changing the law for the better and
encouraging, rather than discouraging further doctrinal development along the same lines.
Smith did none of these things. As a result, despite its promise, it changed the law but little. Despite its intent, defendants
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remain at a severe disadvantage, some the victims of guilty verdicts though they may be innocent.

